Post-submission Substitution of Alternate Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases: Effects of Violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b) and 24(c) by Grunat, Joshua G.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 5 Article 8 
1987 
Post-submission Substitution of Alternate Jurors in Federal 
Criminal Cases: Effects of Violations of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 23(b) and 24(c) 
Joshua G. Grunat 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua G. Grunat, Post-submission Substitution of Alternate Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases: Effects of 
Violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b) and 24(c), 55 Fordham L. Rev. 861 (1987). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol55/iss5/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
POST-SUBMISSION SUBSTITUTION OF ALTERNATE
JURORS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: EFFECTS
OF VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 23(b)
AND 24(c)
INTRODUCTION
At common law, when a juror became incapacitated' or no longer
qualified2 to continue his service on the jury, the juror was discharged
and a mistrial declared. 3 This caused a substantial expenditure of prose-
cution, defense, and court resources.4 The Supreme Court and Congress5
1. A juror becomes incapacitated when, due to physical or mental illness, he is no
longer able to continue his service as part of the jury. See, eg., United States v. Smith,
789 F.2d 196, 204 (3d Cir.) (juror discharged after being severely injured in automobile
accident on fourth day of deliberations), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 668 (1986); Peek v.
Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1482 01th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (juror discharged due to extreme
nervousness); United States v. Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442, 443 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (juror
discharged when he suffered heart attack after four month RICO trial and a day and a
half into deliberations), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.
Unit B Dec. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
2. Courts find jurors not qualified when they appear to be unable to deliberate fairly.
See, e-g., United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 947 (3d Cir.) (finding just cause to
discharge juror who viewed potentially prejudicial document), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 98
(1986); United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir.) (granting juror's request to
be excused on discovering that she had difficulty hearing during trial, finding her unquali-
fied to serve on jury), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985); United States v. Barker, 735
F.2d 1280, 1282 (1lth Cir.) (discharging juror who, en route to deliberations, touched
defendant's shoulder and smiled at him), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984).
3. See LeRoy v. Phillips, 8 Ariz. App. 524, 525, 448 P.2d 94, 95 (1968); People v.
Peete, 54 Cal. App. 333, 365, 202 P. 51, 65 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921); People v. Curran,
286 Ill. 302, 306, 121 N.E. 637, 638 (1918); Dennis v. State, 96 Miss. 96, 97, 50 So. 499,
500 (1909); State v. Dalton, 206 N.C. 507, 512, 174 S.E. 422, 425 (1934). See generally
Note, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b) and 24(c): A Proposal to Reduce Mistri-
als Due to Incapacitated Jurors, 31 Am. U. L. Rev. 651, 651 (1982) [hereinafter Proposal
to Reduce Mistrials] ("At common law, when a juror in a criminal trial became incapaci-
tated ... the proper procedure was to declare a mistrial.., by forming a new jury.").
4. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245 (1983) (to
facilitate pinpoint citation, advisory committee's notes hereinafter will be cited in applica-
ble volume of Federal Rules Decision). The Advisory Committee was particularly con-
cerned with the situation that occurs when a lengthy trial had preceded the discharge of a
juror. "[T]he remedy of mistrial would necessitate a second expenditure of substantial
prosecution, defense and court resources." Id. at 298.
Mistrials, and their consequent retrials, present society with costs inherent in trying the
same case twice. In the analogous situation of grand jury privacy, the Supreme Court
noted that retrials stemming from an invasion of that privacy necessarily result in sub-
stantial costs to society. See United States v. Mechanik, 106 S. Ct. 938, 942 (1986). A
reversal of conviction would force "jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the
defendants to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has
already once taken place." Id. Moreover, a retrial might "'reward the accused with
complete freedom from prosecution,'" id. (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128
(1982)), because the "[p]assage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses
may render retrial difficult, even impossible." Engle, 456 U.S. at 127-28.
5. The Supreme Court has the power to prescribe rules of procedure for the district
courts. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982). Before these rules are prescribed, Advisory Committees
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addressed the problem of mistrials due to discharged jurors in Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule) 23(b)6 and 24(c).7
Rule 24(c) provides for the replacement of a regular juror by an alter-
nate juror prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict.8 Once
the jury retires, the alternate jurors must be discharged.9 If a regular
juror must be discharged after submission of the case to the jury, the
court is faced with the dilemma of how to proceed. As originally
adopted, 'I Rule 23(b) provided a limited solution to the post-submission
discharged juror predicament. If both the prosecution and the defense
agreed, with the court's approval, a valid verdict could be returned by
the remaining jurors.1
In 1983, the Supreme Court and Congress amended Rule 23(b)' 2 to
provide a broader solution.13 The current Rule permits the court, in its
study proposals and make recommendations on the proposed rules. See Warren, An-
nouncement of the Chief Justice of the United States VIII (1960) in Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (West 1986). These recommendations are received by the standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. The standing Committee then reports to
the Judicial Conference of the United States. Once the Judicial Conference approves a
proposed rule, it forwards its recommendations to the Supreme Court. The Court in turn
will "approve, modify, or disapprove of the changes in the Federal Rules," and transmit
any adopted changes to Congress. These adopted changes to the existing Rules "auto-
matically become law in ninety days unless the Congress acts adversely." Id.
6. In the event of the post-submission discharge of a juror, Rule 23(b) now gives the
trial judge the option to either continue with the remaining eleven jurors or declare a
mistrial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 301
(1983) ("it is within the discretion of the court whether to declare a mistrial or to permit
deliberations to continue with 11 jurors").
7. Rule 24(c) provides in pertinent part:
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who,
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be
unable or disqualified to perform their duties.... An alternate juror who does
not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its
verdict.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c) (emphasis added).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Prior to its amendment in 1983, Rule 23(b) provided:
Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in
writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number
less than 12 or that a valid verdict may be returned by a jury of less than 12
should the court find it necessary to excuse one or more jurors for any just cause
after trial commences.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) (West 1982); see also Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 91 F.R.D. 289, 337 (1981) (setting forth then
existing Rules and proposed changes).
11. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) (West 1982).
12. See 97 F.R.D. 245 (1983).
13. In discussing the problems associated with pre-amendment Rule 23(b), the Com-
mittee found the requirement of defendant's consent to be "most undesirable." Id. at
299-300. Thus, amended Rule 23(b) gives the trial court discretion to determine whether
to grant a mistrial or allow deliberations to continue with the remaining 11 jurors. Id. at
301. The amended Rule provides that, absent a stipulation by the defendant, "in the
discretion of the court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors." Id. at
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discretion, to proceed with the remaining eleven jurors. 4 Accordingly,
the trial judge no longer needs the defendant's consent to avoid a
mistrial.15
Despite the solution provided by original Rule 23(b), and the broader
solution provided in its current version, some federal courts, when faced
with post-submission juror discharge, continue to improvise their own
procedures. Many courts permit substitution of an alternate juror for a
discharged regular juror after submission of the case to the jury ("post-
submission substitution"). 6 In preparation for a possible substitution,
some courts send an alternate to sit in and observe the jury's delibera-
tions 7 ("sit-in"). 8 Other courts keep alternate jurors separately seques-
297-98. See United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 205 (3d Cir.) (amended Rule 23(b)
provides a better solution for juror discharge than post-submission substitution), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 668 (1986); see also infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing constitutional and practical problems inherent in post-submission substitution).
14. The 1983 amendments to Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) added the following provision to
the existing rule: "Even absent such stipulation, if the court finds it necessary to excuse a
juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the
court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors." Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 245, 297-98 (1983).
15. See eg., United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 204-05 (3d Cir.) (amendment to
Rule 23(b) gave court discretion to allow remaining eleven jurors to continue delibera-
tions; prior to amendment, stipulation was required), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 668 (1986);
United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 949 (3d Cir.) (noting that Advisory Committee
thought better solution was "to permit the judge, on his own motion, to proceed with a
jury of eleven"), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 98 (1986); United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d
820, 831 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing defendant's request to adjourn for 4 days and proceeded
with remaining jurors), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2285 (1986).
16. "Post-submission substitution" describes the situation that arises when the trial
court discharges a regular juror for cause after deliberations have begun. The court then
substitutes an alternate juror for the discharged regular juror. See eg., United States v.
Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir.) (excusing juror with hearing problems and substitut-
ing an alternate), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985); United States v. Hillard, 546 F.
Supp. 1351, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (substituting alternate juror for regular juror who be-
came ill during deliberations), aff'd, 701 F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d Cir.) (referring to procedure
of substituting an alternate juror after deliberations have begun as "post-submission sub-
stitution"), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
17. See e.g., United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 522 (2d Cir.) (trial judge instructed
two alternates to "sit and listen to the jury's deliberations . . . emphasiz[ing] that
although the alternates could be present, they were not to participate"), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 386 (1985); United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 469 (5th Cir. 1973) (due to
uncertainty of juror's ability to complete deliberations, trial court granted counsel's re-
quest to allow alternate to observe deliberation process; remand for hearing on prejudice
to defendant); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 869-70 (4th Cir.
1964) (allowing alternate to remain with jury throughout deliberation process but in-
structing him not to participate).
18. The term "sit-in," as used in this Note, describes the procedure whereby a court
allows an alternate juror to observe the deliberations, but admonishes him not to partici-
pate. The purpose of this procedure is to have a fully apprised alternate standing by in
the event of juror discharge. See La-tex Supply Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Div., Fruehauf
Corp., 444 F.2d 1366, 1367 (5th Cir.) (noting possibility of need for substitution, trial
court allowed alternate juror to sit in on deliberations but not participate), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 942 (1971).
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tered from the regular jurors until the jury has reached a verdict. 9
These judicially improvised procedures violate the plain language of
Rule 24(c), which requires the discharge of alternate jurors after the jury
retires to consider its verdict.20 The federal courts of appeals are in con-
flict as to whether violations of Rule 24(c) require reversal in all cases. 2'
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applies a rule of per se
reversible error for all violations of Rule 24(c).22 Other courts of appeals
require a showing that the defendant was prejudiced by the post-submis-
sion use of an alternate juror before ordering a reversal.23
19. In this procedure the alternate jurors remain apart from the regular jurors at all
times to prevent communication between them. See United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d
944, 950 (2d Cir.) (three alternates were assigned separate marshalls, separate rooms and
transported in separate vehicles), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968).
20. Rule 24(c) provides in part: "An alternate juror who does not replace a regular
juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict." Fed. R. Crim. P.
24(c).
Courts have construed the language of Rule 24(c)-requiring discharge of the alternate
jurors after the jury retires-as mandatory. See, e.g., United States v. Kaminski, 692
F.2d 505, 518 (8th Cir. 1982) (Rule 24(c) is mandatory and does not contemplate post-
submission substitution); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 994 (5th Cir. Unit B
Dec. 1981) (requirement in Rule 24(c) is mandatory and should be followed), cert. de-
nied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 870-
71 (4th Cir. 1964) (in this sit-in case, the court reversed, finding that language of Rule
24(c) is both explicit and binding on trial judge); see also 8A J. Moore, Moore's Federal
Practice 24.06, at 24-97 (2d ed. 1985) ("The fourth sentence of Rule 24(c) clearly re-
quires that alternate jurors be discharged after the start of jury deliberations."); 2 C.
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 388, at 390 (Criminal 2d ed. 1982) (Rule 24(c)
"states in mandatory terms" that courts are required to discharge alternate jurors after
jury retires).
21. Compare United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978) (viola-
tions of Rules 23(b) and 24(c) are per se plain error) (citing United States v. Virginia
Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964)) and United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468,
470-71 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that once jury began its separate function as "the jury,"
an alternate's presence necessitates mistrial) with United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208,
210 (2d Cir.) (Rule 24(c) violations do not "require reversal per se absent a showing of
prejudice"), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 445 (1986) and United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585,
587 (7th Cir.) ("only prejudicial violations of [Rule 24(c)] are reversible errors"), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985) and Martin v. United States, 691 F.2d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir.
1982) (trial court refused to reverse, citing lack of prejudice to defendant), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1211 (1983) and United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1311 (11 th Cir. 1982)
(holding that extraordinary precautions must be taken to insure that defendant is not
prejudiced by post-submission substitution), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209 (1983).
22. See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978) (reading Vir-
ginia Erection as establishing rule of per se error); United States v. Virginia Erection
Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 870 (4th Cir. 1964) (Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "have the
force and effect of law and are binding on District Judges").
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit treats violations of Rule 24(c) similarly to
the Fourth Circuit. In United States v. Beasley, the court held that once the jury begins
its separate function as "the jury," an alternate's presence would necessitate a mistrial.
464 F.2d 468, 470-71 (10th Cir. 1972). But see United States v. Kaminski, 692 F.2d 505,
518 (8th Cir. 1982) (characterizing Beasley holding as plain error rule but rejecting it in
favor of prejudice to defendant test).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 523 (2d Cir.) (showing of prejudice
required for reversal), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 386 (1985); United States v. Barker, 735
F.2d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir.) (post-submission substitution not reversible error unless de-
ALTERNATE JURORS
This Note argues that the defandant's substantial rights are affected
whenever the judicially improvised procedure involves post-submission
personal contact between the alternate and regular jurors. Part I of this
Note presents an overview of a defendant's constitutional right to trial by
jury. Part II discusses the development of the jury trial right under the
Rules. Part III analyzes the effects of judicial improvisations that stem
from the reluctance of trial courts to declare mistrials after the post-sub-
mission discharge of a juror. This Note concludes that when the judi-
cially improvised procedure results in post-submission contact between
an alternate juror and the regular jurors, reversal should be required.
When no such contact occurs, the procedure used amounts to nothing
more than harmless error.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
The common law right of a criminal defendant to trial by jury24 is
guaranteed in the United States Constitution. 25 In interpreting the jury
trial right, the Supreme Court originally held that the words "jury" and
"trial by jury," as used in the Constitution, have the same meaning as at
common law. 26 For a jury to be constitutional, therefore, it had to con-
sist "of twelve persons, neither more nor less.",21 Prior to 1970, the
Court reaffimed that twelve-member juries were constitutionally man-
dated in federal criminal cases.28
In Williams v. Florida,29 however, the Supreme Court held that only
those features essential to the common law jury's purpose are preserved
in the Constitution. 0 The Court found that one essential feature is the
fendant prejudiced), cert denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984); United States v. Kaminski, 692
F.2d 505, 518 (8th Cir. 1982) (decisions requiring reversal only on some showing of preju-
dice are better reasoned than those supporting rule of per se plain-error).
24. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 0970) (long history of right to trial
by jury); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898) ("Those who emigrated to this
country from England brought with them this great [common law right to jury trial]
...."); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-55 (1968) (tracing history ofjury
trial right); 3 L. Orfield, Orfield's Criminal Procedure under the Federal Rules § 23:2, at
4-5 (2d ed. 1986) (jury trial right has "traditionally been one of the most important rights
of the criminal defendant").
25. See Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (1986) (jury trial right guarantees
defendant an impartial jury); Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (right to jury
trial in criminal cases is "fundamental to our system of justice"); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2,
cl. 3 ("[t]he trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury"); U.S.
Const. amend. VI (guarantee of trial by impartial jury). See generally, 3 L. Orfield, supra
note 24, § 23:2, at 4-5 (setting out constitutional right to trial by jury as implemented in
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
26. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898). The Thompson Court traced the
right to twelve-member juries back to the Magna Charta and English common law. Id.
at 349-50.
27. Id. at 349.
28. See Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1, 10 (1961); Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276, 292 (1930).
29. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
30. Id. at 99-100.
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"commonsense judgment of a group of laymen," free from outside influ-
ences.3 Noting that the number twelve was merely an historical acci-
dent of no great significance,32 the Court stated that considerations of
jury size are left to Congress.33 Thus, a jury in federal criminal cases,
contrary to the earlier Supreme Court decisions, 34 no longer must be
made up of twelve persons to pass constitutional muster.35
Lower courts have explained further the essential features of the jury.
They have held that to facilitate constitutionally required jury impartial-
ity, courts should protect the privacy and secrecy of jury deliberations. 6
In addition, it is essential that the law zealously protect the jury's sanc-
tity by keeping it free from intentional unauthorized intrusions.37 Fur-
ther, each juror must be able to act with the independence and freedom
of action requisite to a fair trial.38
Within these constitutional parameters, the Supreme Court and Con-
gress have addressed jury procedure in the Rules39 by providing for
31. Id. at 100.
32. The Court concluded "the fact that the jury at common law was composed of
precisely 12 is a historical accident ... wholly without significance 'except to mystics.'"
Id. at 102 (quoting in part Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 182 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
33. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970).
34. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
35. Twelve-man jury "is not a necessary ingredient of 'trial by jury.'" See Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
36. See United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982) (deliberations
kept private to ensure that jury's judgment is "not affected by outside influences");
United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 872 (4th Cir. 1964) ("cardinal
principle that the deliberations of the jury shall remain private and secret in every case").
37. See Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956). In Remmer, a juror was
improperly approached by an outsider who offered him money for a favorable verdict.
The Court ordered a new trial and held "it is the law's objective to guard jealously the
sanctity of the jury's right to operate [free] from outside unauthorized intrusions purpose-
fully made." Id. at 382.
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) sets the boundaries for authorized intrusions into the
jury. The Rule specifically prohibits a juror from testifying about his mental processes in
reaching a verdict. See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). A juror may, however, testify as to whether
any "extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention
.... Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
For example, in Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959), the Supreme Court
implicitly approved questioning jurors to determine whether they have been exposed to
prejudicial information. Id. at 312. In Marshall, the jury viewed two newspaper ac-
counts of the defendant's prior criminal record. Id. at 311-12. This information was
ruled inadmissible at trial. Id. at 312. The Supreme Court based its reversal of the con-
viction on the exposure of the jury to this prejudicial information. Id. at 312-13.
Thus, although juries are to be kept free from outside influences, in limited circum-
stances, evidentiary hearings to determine prejudice may be necessary to protect a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. See infra notes 114-19.
38. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510-12 (1978) (upholding declaration of
mistrial stemming from improper argument by counsel noting that each juror must be
capable of exercising that freedom and independence of action requisite to a fair trial).
39. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23 ("Trial by Jury or by the Court"); Fed. R. Crim. P. 24
("Trial Jurors").
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twelve-member juries as the national norm.'
II. THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Rules 23(b) and 24(c): The Problem of Post-Submission Discharge
Prior to the 1983 Amendments
As originally enacted, Rules 23(b) 4 and 24(c) 42 presented courts with
"a most difficult issue concerning the fair and efficient administration of
justice."'4 Absent the defendant's consent, cases of post-submission ju-
ror disqualification or incapacitation necessarily would end in mistrials.
44
These mistrials were mandated both at common law45 and by the interac-
tion of pre-amendment Rules 23(b) and 24(c)."
The option of forcing a mistrial not only was costly and time consum-
ing,47 but it also gave the defendant a tactical advantage. 48 These con-
40. Rule 23(b) provides that unless a juror is discharged for cause "Djuries shall be of
12." Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b). See United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.)
("federal rules of criminal procedure establish juries of twelve as the national norm"),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 445 (1986).
41. See 5 F.R.D. 573, 593; see also Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 40-41
(N.Y.U. School of Law 1946) (original Rule 23(b)); supra note 10.
42. See 5 F.R.D. 573, 594; see also Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 42-43
(N.Y.U. School of Law 1946) (original Rule 24(c)).
43. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 298 (1983).
44. In light of the requirement in pre-amendment Rule 23(b) for defendant's consent
to a jury of less than twelve, the interaction between Rules 23(b) and 24(c) mandated a
mistrial if defendant would not agree to continue. See infra note 46 and accompanying
text; cf. United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir.) (Rule 24(c) limits time
period in which regular juror may be replaced "to the period prior to the commencement
of deliberations"), cert denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
45. See LeRoy v. Phillips, 8 Ariz. App. 524, 525, 448 P.2d 94, 95 (1968); People v.
Peete, 54 Cal. App. 333, 365, 202 P. 51, 65 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921); People v. Curran,
286 11 302, 306, 121 N.E. 637, 638 (1918); Dennis v. State, 96 Miss. 96, 97, 50 So. 499,
500 (1909); State v. Dalton, 206 N.C. 507, 512, 174 S.E. 422, 425 (1934). See generally
Proposal to Reduce Mistrials, supra note 3, at 651 (discussing common law rule requiring
mistrial).
46. See United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 948 (3d Cir.) ("the interaction be-
tween [pre-amendment] Rules 23(b) and 24(c) enabled defendants to force a mistrial" in
cases of post-submission juror discharge), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 98 (1986).
47. See United States v. Mechanik, 106 S. Ct. 938, 942 (1986). According to the
Court, retrials result in substantial costs to society: "it forces jurors, witnesses, courts,
the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, energy and other resources to
repeat a trial that has already once taken place." Id.; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)
advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 298 (1983). A mistrial would "necessitate a
second expenditure of substantial prosecution, defense and court resources." Id. In addi-
tion, these mistrials affect the court's ability to satisfy the "speedy trial" rights of others.
Id. at 300.
48. Defendant will not stipulate to a jury of less than twelve "in any case in which
defense counsel believe some tactical advantage will be gained by retrial." Fed. R. Crim.
P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 299 (1983). Tactical advantages in-
clude witnesses' fading memories, unavailability of witnesses and other time related fac-
tors, thereby making retrial almost impossible. See United States v. Mechanik, 106 S. Ct.
938, 942 (1986); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-54, 862 (1978); Abney v.
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cerns prompted courts to improvise their own procedures in cases of
post-submission juror discharge.49
B. Proposed Amendments to Rules 23 and 24
The proposed amendments to Rules 23 and 24 were designed to cure
the evil of forced mistrials caused by the post-submission discharge of a
juror." Providing guidance in this area was consistent with the intent of
the Rules to aid in establishing simple and uniform federal criminal pro-
cedures." In the event of post-submission discharge of a regular juror,
the proposed amendment to Rule 23 gave the court discretion to accept a
verdict by the remaining eleven jurors.12 This proposal abolished the
need for the defendant's consent, 53 thereby stripping him of his tactical
advantage. 4 The Supreme Court adopted this proposal and amended
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126
(1962).
49. Two procedures frequently used are post-submission substitution and sit-in. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 299-301 (1983); supra
notes 16-18 and accompanying text; see, e.g., United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 209
(2d Cir.) (trial court allowed alternate to retire with jury and "participate in the verdict
since he had 'stuck through'" long trial), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 445 (1986); United States
v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 522-23 (2d Cir.) (trial judge permitted two alternates to sit in on
jury's deliberations), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 386 (1985); United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d
585, 587 (7th Cir.) (court substituted alternate after nine-minute deliberation had taken
place), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 990-91
(5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981) (over objection by defense counsel, court substituted alternate
after 12 hours of deliberation), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); United States v. Vir-
ginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 869-70 (4th Cir. 1964) (trial court permitted alternate
to retire with jury but not participate in deliberations).
50. See United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 831 (2d Cir. 1985) (amendment to
Rule 23(b) was "prompted by the dilemma" of forced mistrials due to post-submission
juror discharge), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2285 (1986); see also Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, advisory committee's
note, 91 F.R.D. 289, 338, 343-44 (1981) (Advisory Committee established that "it is es-
sential that there be available a course of action other than mistrial").
The Advisory Committee noted that it was understandable that trial courts used post-
submission substitution as a mechanism to avoid mistrials. The preferred change in the
Federal Rules, however, is to give the trial court discretion to allow deliberations to con-
tinue with the remaining eleven jurors. Id. at 338-40.
51. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 2 (providing for simplicity in federal criminal procedure);
Clark, Foreword to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure at iv (N.Y.U. School of Law
1946) (Rules "are the essence of brevity, simplicity and uniformity"); see also United
States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.) ("it is desirable that there be consistency in
the method of jury selection throughout the federal court system"), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 445 (1986); United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 540 (2d Cir.) (consistency in
method of discharging alternate jurors is "desirable in the interest of stability and uni-
formity"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979); infra note 68 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Fed. R. Crim. P. 2).
52. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 91 F.R.D. 289, 337-38 0981).
53. The proposed rule provided for a discretionary verdict by eleven jurors without
the defendant's consent. Id.
54. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, advisory committee's note, 91 F.R.D. 289, 339 (1981).
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Rule 23(b)."
The proposed amendment to Rule 24, on the other hand, provided for
the post-submission substitution procedure.56 A similar proposal was re-
jected by the drafters of the original rules.5 7 After careful considera-
tion5 8 of both the constitutional and policy implications of the proposed
amendments,5 9 the Advisory Committee rejected post-submission substi-
55. See 97 F.R.D. 245 (1983).
56. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 91 F.R.D. 289, 341-43 0981) (proposal deleted provision requiring discharge
of alternates when jury retires and added subdivision (d) that provided for post-submis-
sion substitution).
57. Rule 24, the trial juror rule, developed after the Judicial Conference Committee
circulated a series of drafts for comment. See Orfield, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal
Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 44-54 (1962). An early draft provided for post-submission substitu-
tion of an alternate juror for a discharged regular juror. See id. at 45-47; see also State v.
Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d 291, 309 n.14, 321 N.W.2d 212, 221 n.14 (1982) (discussing an
early draft of Rules that provided for post-submission substitution that was later rejected)
(citing Orfield, supra, at 46). In its comments on one of the drafts, however, the Supreme
Court questioned whether the drafters of the Rules had addressed adequately whether the
substitution procedure was desirable and constitutional. See Orfield, supra at 46. The
Court asked the Committee if it "satisfied itself that it is desirable or constitutional that
an alternate may be substituted after the jury has retired and begun its deliberation." Id.
In apparent response to the Court's concerns, the drafters removed the post-submission
substitution provision. Id. at 47. The final form of the rule on alternate jurors did not
provide for post-submission substitution. See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 42-43
(N.Y.U. School of Law 1946) (Rule 24(c) provided in part that "[a]n alternate juror who
does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its
verdict"); see also Orfield, supra, at 50 (rule adopted did not provide for post-submission
substitution). Thus, an alternate juror may not participate in deliberations unless he has
been substituted for a regular juror before the jury retires. This version of "[t]he original
Rules of Criminal Procedure . . .[was] transmitted to the Congress by the Attorney
General on January 3, 1945 and became effective on March 21, 1946." 18 U.S.C. app.
556 Historical Note (1982). See Clark, Foreword to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
at xx-xxi (N.Y.U. School of Law 1946) (Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were trans-
mitted by Supreme Court to Attorney General on Dec. 26, 1944, who in turn submitted
them to Congress on Jan. 3, 1945).
58. Post-submission substitution was considered and rejected when the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure were originally drafted. See supra note 57. The procedure was
again considered and rejected when the 1983 amendment to Rule 23(b) was being stud-
ied. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 298-301
(1983). In addition, rejection of post-submission substitution as a remedy for the dis-
charged juror problem represents the "national consensus of bench and bar." United
States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 540 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979). See
generally Warren, Announcement of the Chief Justice of the United States (1960) in Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, VII-VIII (West 1986) (rules and amendments should
be continuously studied by representatives of judiciary, bar, and by legal scholars).
59. See Fed. R_ Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 91 F.RID. 289, 340-41
(1981) (constitutional difficulties with fifth amendment due process and sixth amendment
right to trial by jury, practical difficulties include: no way to nullify effects of prior delib-
erations, possible violations of jury privacy and coercive effect on alternate).
The Committee also noted that its rejection of post-submission substitution was in ac-
cord with the judgment of most commentators. See id. at 340; C. Wright, supra note 20,
§ 388, at 393 (doubts expressed about constitutionality and desirability of post-submis-
sion substitution "are as forceful now as they were when [the Supreme Court] first
voiced" them).
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tution in favor of the discretionary eleven-member jury verdict provided
by proposed Rule 23(b). ° Thus, Rule 24(c) retained the provision re-
quiring the discharge of alternate jurors after the jury retires."
Although the Committee appreciated that trial judges would seek to
avoid costly mistrials,62 it found that providing for a discretionary ver-
dict with only eleven jurors was much less objectionable than allowing
post-submission substitution.6" Post-submission substitution requires
that an alternate either sit in on the jury's deliberations or participate in
the deliberations even though he was not present during the earlier jury
discussions.' Sit-in procedures violate the privacy and secrecy of the
jury.6 5 The inherent coercive effect of either procedure on an alternate
might affect his decision-making process.66 In addition, the regular ju-
rors cannot nullify the effects of the prior deliberations on their ultimate
decision.67 The Committee thus rejected this proposal to amend Rule 24
and adopted the amendment to Rule 23 in its stead.
C. Procedural Considerations: Violations of the Federal Rules
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are intended to provide for
60. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 300 (1983).
The Advisory Committee rejected the proposed amendment to Rule 24(c) that would
have provided for post-submission substitution. See United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d
938, 948 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 98 (1986). It was preferable to allow an eleven-
member jury rather than to provide for post-submission substitution. See 2 C. Wright,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 388, at 42 (Criminal 2d ed. Supp. 1986).
61. See supra note 57.
62. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 299-300
(1983) (Committee found it understandable for trial judge to elect post-submission substi-
tution rather than declare a mistrial).
63. The Committee noted that it is "far better to permit the deliberations to continue
with a jury of 11 than to make a [post-submission] substitution." Id. at 300.
64. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 91 F.R.D. 289, 340 (1981) (quoting 2 C. Wright, supra note 20 § 388, at 392-
93).
65. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 91 F.R.D. 289, 341 (1981) (sit-in procedure violates "the cardinal principle
that the deliberations of the jury shall remain private and secret in every case") (quoting
United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 872 (4th Cir. 1964)); see also
United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75, 81 (1st Cir.) (in dicta, court noted that in sit-in
cases, alternate's presence would destroy jury's sanctity), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1089
(1982); United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1391 (lth Cir. 1982) (alternate's inadver-
tent "presence in the jury room.., was undeniably an intrusion into the sanctity of thejury"); United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 470 (10th Cir. 1972) (presence of alternate
in jury room violated the "cardinal principle" of jury secrecy) (quoting United States v.
Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 872 (4th Cir. 1964)). But see Johnson v. Duck-
worth, 650 F.2d 122, 124-25 (7th Cir.) (per curiam) (substitution by sit-in alternate
"quite practical and not constitutionally improper;" noting that alternates are not same
as other strangers to jury), cert denied, 454 U.S.867 (1981).
66. See infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text (discussing inherent coercive effect
of substitution procedure on substituted alternate jurors).
67. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 301 (1983)
(even if reconstituted jury was instructed to begin anew, original jurors would be influ-
enced by first deliberations).
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simplicity in procedure and fairness in the administration of justice.6"
Ad hoc deviations from the procedures chosen by the Supreme Court
and Congress may impinge on these goals.69 Nevertheless, some courts
do not always adhere to the Rules.70 The Supreme Court addressed this
problem by furnishing a standard to review such judicial departures.7
Rules 52(a) and 57 codify the standard of review of judicial departures
from the Rules. Rule 52(a) requires that any deviation from the Rules
must affect the defendant's substantial rights before reversal is proper.'
This Rule has been interpreted as rendering harmless any error that does
not influence the jury's decision.73 In addition, Rule 57 permits courts to
improvise local procedures provided they are not inconsistent with the
Federal Rules.74
The Supreme Court has considered the proper treatment to accord ju-
dicial departures from the Rules. In Fallen v. United States,"5 the Court
stated that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were never meant to
be an unbending code.76 Courts examining deviations from the Rules,
68. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 2 ("[tjhese rules... shall be construed to secure simplicity in
procedure [and] fairness in administration").
69. Many courts find consistency in procedure to be a desirable end product of adher-
ence to rules of procedure. See United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 107 S. Ct. 445 (1986); United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 540 (2d Cir.), cerL
denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979); cf. State v. Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d 291, 313, 321 N.W.2d 212,
223 (1982) (analyzing state statute regulating jury procedure, noting that whether to allow
post-submission substitution is a policy consideration that "should not be made by [the
courts] on a case-by-case basis").
70. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 209 (2d Cir.) (alternate allowed to
participate in deliberations since he 'stuck through' long trial), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 445
(1986); a United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir.) (trial judge excused juror
with hearing problems, then recalled and substituted alternate who had already been dis-
charged), cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985); United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 469
(5th Cir. 1973) (trial court allowed alternate to observe deliberations).
71. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (harmless error); Fed. R. Crim. P. 57 (district courts
may "regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with [the Rules] . . ."); see
also supra note 5 (discussing Supreme Court's authority to promulgate rules of
procedure).
72. Rule 52(a) provides in part: "Any error.., which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded." Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) advi-
sory committee's note (West 1986) (Rule 52(a) restates existing law that provides for
disregard of "technical errors . . . which do not affect the [defendant's] substantial
rights") (citation omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. former § 391).
73. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967); see also United States v.
Ong, 541 F.2d 331, 338 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming conviction despite possible erroneous
admission of evidence noting that error is harmless unless it affects jury's verdict), cerL
denied, 430 U.S. 934 (1977); Loftis v. Beto, 450 F.2d 599, 601-02 (5th Cir. 1971) (prejudi-
cial information heard by jury was harmless error because evidence properly received left
no room for jury to find any reasonable doubt as to guilt).
74. Rule 57 provides in pertinent part that: district courts may "regulate their prac-
tice in any manner not inconsistent with [the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure]."
Fed. R Crim. P. 57.
75. 378 U.S. 139 (1964).
76. "[T]he Rules are not, and were not intended to be, a rigid code to have an inflexi-
ble meaning irrespective of the circumstances." Id. at 142.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
therefore, must consider the circumstances in each case." The focal
point of this consideration must be the effect the deviation had on the
defendant's substantial rights. Thus, deviations from the Rules trigger a
determination of what effect that deviation had on the defendants' sub-
stantial rights.7"
III. THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DEPARTURES FROM FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 23(B) AND 24(c)
Despite the solution authorized by Rules 23(b) and 24(c), some courts
continue to improvise local procedures.79 To analyze the cases that ad-
dress judicial departures from Rules 23(b) and 24(c), it is helpful to di-
vide them into two fact patterns.8 0 The first group of cases involves post-
submission contact between an alternate juror and the regular jurors
("contact cases").8" The second group involves no contact between an
alternate and the regular jurors ("no-contact cases").8 2
A. Case Classifications
1. Contact Cases
Cases involving post-submission contact may be subdivided into three
procedural classifications. First, the trial judge may permit an alternate
77. See id.
78. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
80. The two groups utilized in this analysis make no reference to waivability of the
defendant's right to a jury trial, both constitutional and under the Rules. The standard
for waiver of the defendant's jury trial right under the Rules presents another area of
conflict in the courts of appeals. Many of the courts discussed in Part III partially base
their holdings on defendant's waiver of his right to jury trial. The standard for waiver of
these rights is a separate issue in conflict and beyond the scope of this Note. Compare
United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 870 (4th Cir. 1964) (requiring
defendant's personal assent to waiver) with United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587
(7th Cir. 1985) (waiver by counsel is sufficient), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985).
Although this conflict has been noticed by Supreme Court, it has denied certiorari. See
United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 445 (1986) (White,
J., dissenting).
81. The contact cases arise when there has been personal contact between an alternate
juror and the regular jurors after the jury has retired for deliberation. This usually occurs
either where the court sends an alternate to observe the deliberations or substitutes him
for a discharged regular juror. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
82. The no-contact cases occur when a trial judge keeps one or more alternate jurors
separately sequestered from the regular jury. In this manner, the court insures that no
personal contact occurs between the regular jurors and an alternate. See infra notes 87-
90 and accompanying text.
A recent example of a no-contact case occurred in United States v, Badalamenti, 84
Crim. 236 (PNL) (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (popularly known as the "pizza connection" drug
trial). Although no written opinion has been rendered in the case as of this publication,
the relevant facts were set forth in a recent newspaper article. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 28,
1986, at 35, col. 6. During deliberations, a juror was excused from further service because
of threats to her family. Although there were still three alternates sequestered, the court
elected to proceed with the remaining eleven jurors, despite defendants' objections. Id.
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to be substituted for a discharged regular juror after deliberations have
begun. 3 Second, the trial court, in anticipation of post-submission sub-
stitution, may use the sit-in procedure, thereby permitting an alternate to
observe the deliberations of the regular jurors.8" Finally, the trial court
may inadvertently send an alternate to retire with the full complement of
regular jurors. 5
All three of these procedures create an opportunity for the alternate
and regular jurors to communicate with each other.
2. No-Contact Cases
The cases that involve no post-submission contact between the regular
jurors and an alternate usually arise out of the trial judge's concerns that
a regular juror may be unable to complete his service on the jury.8 6 In
preparation for this, the trial judge violates the express provision of Rule
24(c)s7 by keeping one or more alternate jurors either on call 8 or seques-
tered from the regular jurors.8 9
Once the deliberations begin, separate sequestration ensures that the
alternate jurors do not communicate with the regular jurors. In contrast
to the contact cases, the alternate never joins the regular jury.
83. Se4 e.g., Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1482 (1th Cir. 1986) (en banc); United
States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985); United
States v. Barker, 735 F.2d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984).
84. See e.g., United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 522 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 386 (1985); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 869 (4th Cir.
1964).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1389 (01th Cir. 1982) (alternate
who inadvertantly was permitted to retire with jury was elected foreman); United States
v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978) (alternate retired with jury and went
unnoticed for forty-five minutes); United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 469 (10th Cir.
1972) (alternate participated in jury's election of foreman and voted to break for lunch
before court realized that alternate had not been discharged).
86. See Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1966) (in light ofjuror's
commitment to undergo serious surgery, trial court retained alternate in violation of Rule
24(c)); see also United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir.) (discussing Govern-
ment's brief, court acknowledged that "this procedure presents counsel with the choice of
consenting to a substitution if one of the regular jurors [becomes] disqualified" but held
that this is no reason to violate Rules), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968).
87. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c). The Rule mandates that "[a]n alternate juror who
does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its
verdict." (emphasis added); see also supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
88. See United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 1975) (trial judge
instructed alternate juror to "stand-by" in case needed).
89. See, eg., United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 799 (9th Cir. 1984) (alternate
jurors kept separately sequestered); United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir.)
(three alternates kept separately sequestered), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968); see also
United States v. Badalamenti, 84 Crim. 236 (PNL) (E.D.N.Y. 1987), discussed in, N. Y.
Times, Feb. 28, 1986 at 35, col. 6 (three alternate jurors remained available after a day
and one-half of deliberations).
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B. Application of the Constitution and Federal Rules to the Post.
Submission Contact Cases
In post-submission contact cases, 90 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit follows a per se rule of reversible error.91 Other courts,
however, require a showing that the defendant has been prejudiced by
such contact. 92 Constitutional and legislative considerations, however,
mandate reversal in all cases of post-submission contact because the de-
fendant's right to trial by an impartial jury is endangered.
For a variety of reasons, courts that require a showing of prejudice to
the defendant find neither prejudice nor any violations of the defendants'
constitutional rights by the post-submission contact.93 Noting that Rule
24(c) is not constitutionally mandated,94 many of these courts find any
prejudice to the defendant to be speculative. 95 Courts departing from the
Rules support this finding by comparing the amount of time taken for the
second deliberation period with the first. Provided that sufficient time is
spent for the second deliberation period, in comparision to the first,
courts conclude that the defendant was convicted after a full and fair
deliberation. 96 In addition, these courts generally rely on curative in-
90. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (defining post-submission contact).
91. See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978) (reading
United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964) to establish "a per
se rule of plain error").
92. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 523 (2d Cir.) (reversal for violations
of Rule 24(c) requires showing of prejudice), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 386 (1985); United
States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1309 (1th Cir. 1982) (appropriate standard for reversal
is prejudice to defendant), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209 (1983); United States v. Phillips,
664 F.2d 971, 995-96 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981) (new trial not warranted because safe-
guards utilized by trial court minimized danger of undue prejudice), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1136 (1982).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1309 (1th Cir. 1982) (holding
post-submission substitution is not constitutional violation when properly qualified alter-
nate participates fully in all deliberations leading to verdict), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209
(1983); Uniteds States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 992-93 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981) (post-
submission substitution not deprivation of defendant's constitutional rights), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
94. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 992-93 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981)
(constitutional right to trial by jury is not violated by post-submission substitution of
qualified alternate that "'fully participates in all of the deliberations which lead to a
verdict.'" (quoting People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 693, 552 P.2d 742, 746, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 782, 786 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1977)), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136
(1982).
95. See United States v. Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442, 444 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1136 (1982); accord United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. Fla. 1979). But
see United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1975). The Lamb court reversed the
conviction, see id. at 1157, noting the short duration of the second deliberation period in
comparison to the first. See id. at 1156. In a footnote, however, the court stated that the
length of the second deliberation period was irrelevent in the face of a violation of the
express language of Rule 24(c). See id. at 1156 n.7.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir.) (finding initial nine-
minute deliberation not critical to reconstituted jury's verdict), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055
(1985); United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir.) (length of jury's second
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structions to reduce substantially or eliminate any prejudice to the de-
fendant.97 Moreover, by questioning all of the jurors regarding their
ability to begin deliberations anew, with an open mind, the trial judge
seeks to satisfy the constitutional requirement of jury impartiality.9"
The following analysis demonstrates that in all contact cases the de-
fendant is prejudiced and a new trial should be granted. Moreover, sit-in
and post-submission substitution procedures are contrary to the proce-
dural choice of the Supreme Court and Congress. No-contact cases,
however, present mere technical violations of the Rules and do not affect
substantial rights of the defendant. Accordingly, departures from the
Rules in the no-contact cases should be treated as harmless error.
1. Deference to the Procedural Choices Embodied in the Rules
Courts that refuse to reverse in post-submission contact cases do not
give sufficient weight to the procedures selected by the Supreme Court
and Congress, codified in Rules 23 and 24." In Williams v. Florida,"°
the Supreme Court expressly held that considerations bearing on the de-
sirability of a twelve-member jury in federal criminal trials are left to
Congress.101 Congress, in turn, granted procedural rule-making author-
deliberation period added further support to finding that defendants were not prejudiced),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 996 (5th Cir.
Unit B Dec. 1981) (second deliberation, lasting for six days, contributed to negation of
any coercive effect on alternate), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
97. Courts rely on curative instructions for violations of Rule 24(c) by both sit-in
procedures and post-submission substitution.
An example of the sit-in procedure may be found in United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d
518 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 386 (1985). The Jones court permitted an alternate
to sit in on the deliberations of the jury until it was brought to its attention that the
procedure is impermissible. See id. at 521-22. The court then removed the alternate and
instructed the jury to begin its deliberations anew. See id. at 522. It further instructed
the jury to disregard any participation by the alternate in the prior deliberations. See id.
at 523.
A court utilizing the post-submission substitution procedure similarly relied on cura-
tive instructions. The trial court questioned each juror whether "he or she could wipe
from his or her mind the [previous] deliberations." United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d
971, 991 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982). After ascertain-
ing that the jury could deliberate impartially, the court instructed the jury to "start [its
deliberations] fresh and anew." Id.
Another court using post-submission substitution "repeatedly emphasized that the ju-
rors were duty-bound to begin their deliberations afresh." United States v. Kopituk, 690
F.2d 1289, 1307 (11th Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1057-
60 (2d Cir.) (because trial court instructed jury to begin anew, court of appeals found that
"careful instruction and supervision from the trial court" sufficiently minimized any dan-
ger stemming from substitution), cert denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
98. In United States v. Barker, 735 F.2d 1280 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933
(1984), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that after a thorough exami-
nation of the jurors, the trial judge ascertained that each juror could deliberate impar-
tially. Id. at 1282-83. The trial court then instructed the reconstituted jury to begin their
deliberations anew. Id. at 1283.
99. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
100. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
101. Id. at 103; see United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 831 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting
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ity to the Supreme Court.' Through this rule-making process the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure established a twelve-member jury as
the national norm for federal criminal cases."0 3 Rules 23 and 24, the jury
procedure rules, are phrased in express, unambiguous language that is
frequently interpreted as mandatory."°
Deviations from Rules 23 and 24 by the lower courts demonstrates a
refusal"0 5 to adhere to a recently amended rule of procedure that ex-
pressly governs the use of alternate jurors.1" 6 Indeed, these courts cir-
cumvent the Rules by using procedures expressly rejected by both the
original drafters10 7 and the Advisory Committee.'0 8
2. Sanctity of the Jury
Differing judicial views of an alternate's role'019 contribute to the con-
flict in the courts over the effect of substitution on the defendant's sub-
stantial rights. The issue concerns the policy of keeping jury
deliberations private. If an alternate no longer has legal standing as a
that considerations of jury size were expressly left to Congress) (citing Williams v. Flor-
ida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2285 (1986).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982).
103. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b); see also United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d
Cir.) ("federal rules of criminal procedure establish juries of twelve as the national
norm"), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 445 (1986); United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 540
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979) (Rules provide solution that represents "na-
tional consensus of bench and bar").
104. See United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1058 (2d Cir.) (Rule 24(c) is
mandatory), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); United States v. Kaminski, 692 F.2d 505,
518 (8th Cir. 1982) (post-submission substitution is inconsistent with mandatory Rules
23(b) and 24(c)); see also United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir.) (policy and
language of Rule 24(c) prohibits post-submission substitution), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055
(1985).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587, 589 (7th Cir.) (affirming
conviction despite stating that substitution of alternate juror is prohibited by policy and
language of federal rules), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985); United States v. Hillard, 701
F.2d 1052, 1058, 1064 (2d Cir.) (affirming conviction despite characterizing language in
Rule 24(c) as mandatory), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); United States v. Phillips, 664
F.2d 971, 994 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981) (affirming conviction but admitting that "Rule
24(c) has been held by [the Fifth Circuit] to be 'a mandatory [rule] that should be scrupu-
lously followed'" (quoting United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1973))),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982). But see United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335
F.2d 868, 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1964) (reversing defendant's conviction holding that Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure "have the force and effect of law and are binding on District
Judges").
106. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
109. Compare United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1973) ("In no sense
did [the alternate] have standing as a member of the jury.") and United States v. Virginia
Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 871 (4th Cir. 1964) ("It is certain that the alternate.., had
no legal standing as a juror.") with Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 125 & n.7 (7th
Cir.) (per curiam) (although alternate's presence under state's sit-in procedure invades
jury's privacy, alternates are not same as "[o]ther 'strangers' to the regular jury ... ),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981).
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juror once the jury retires to consider its verdict, it necessarily follows
that the alternate's presence in the jury room violates the privacy and
sanctity of the jury's deliberations.110
Maintaining jury privacy is essential to keeping jury verdicts free from
the effects of outside influences.1"' Even if the alternate obeys all instruc-
tions to remain silent and not participate in the deliberations, his attitude
towards the defendant can be conveyed to the regular jurors through ges-
tures, facial expressions and the like." 2 Jurors are asked to determine the
credibility of a witness, using both verbal and non-verbal means. 1"3 Simi-
larly, an alternate juror's non-verbal communication may affect the deci-
sion-making processes of the regular jurors.
Some courts require an evidentiary hearing to determine if the alter-
nate's presence has prejudiced the defendant. "4 These hearings, how-
ever, may constitute a second invasion of the jury's sanctity. I" Regular
use of evidentiary hearings may stifle the jury's debate." 6 In addition,
jurors who expect their deliberations to be examined may be pressured
into reaching popular verdicts. I7 Thus, strict guidelines for questioning
jurors have been established." 8 The need to ensure a just determination
of every action, 119 can be met by limiting inquiries into the jury to uncov-
ering events that have improperly influenced the jury's verdict, without
delving into the jurors' mental processes. 120
110. The alternate's presence during deliberations "violate[s] the cardinal principle
that the deliberations of the jury shall remain private and secret." Virginia Erection, 335
F.2d at 872. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 301
(1983) (quoting Virginia Erection, at 872).
111. Once the jury retires, the alternate is considered to be just like any other outsider
to the jury's deliberations. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
112. See United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 872 (4th Cir. 1964)
(alternate's attitude, "conveyed by facial expressions, gestures or the like," might affect
jury's decision).
113. In Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952), Judge Learned Hand stated
that witnesses' "carriage, behavior, bearing, manner and appearance" are part of the evi-
dence. Id. at 268-69. In addition, a jury should "take into consideration the whole nexus
of sense impressions which they get from a witness." Id. at 269.
114. See United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 472-73 (5th Cir. 1973).
115. United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 470 (10th Cir. 1972) (evidentiary hearings
are themselves "dangerous intrusion[s] into the proceedings of the jury").
116: Jury debate may be stifled if a juror is concerned with future exposure of the
deliberations. See Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 886,
889 (1983) (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933)).
117. There are serious concerns with post-verdict juror interviews whether they are
conducted by the litigants, their attorneys or the court. See id. at 888. These intrusions
into the jury may affect "fairness to future litigants and the stability and public accept-
ance of verdicts." Id. at 889. In addition, jurors might feel pressured into reaching popu-
lar verdicts. Id. at 890.
118. See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
119. See 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence 606[03], at 606-23 (1985).
120. See id; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b) and its regulation of propriety of post-verdict juror testimony); S.
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3. Sixth Amendment Right to an Impartial Jury
The sixth amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to be
tried by an impartial jury' 2' that is free from outside influences. 122 Any
post-submission contact, therefore, endangers the impartiality of the
jury.
When an alternate juror joins a jury that has already begun deliberat-
ing and that is favorably disposed to a guilty verdict, there is an "inher-
ent coercive effect" on him to agree prematurely with the regular
jurors. 123 Psychological research demonstrates that new group members
are "unable to change the traditions" of an established group.' 24 More-
over, one study shows that an individual facing a group consensus may
surrender his own factually correct perceptions in favor of the incorrect
group conclusion.' 25 This willingness to conform to the group supports
Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 448, 448-64 (4th ed. 1986)
(same).
121. The sixth amendment provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... ." U.S. Const.
amend. VI.
122. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
123. See United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) ("tlhe inherent
coercive effect upon an alternate who joins a jury that has... already agreed that the
accused is guilty is substantial"); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's
note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 301 (1983) (central difliculty with post-submission substitution is
that "the continuing jurors would be influenced by the earlier deliberations and that the
new juror would be somewhat intimidated by the [other jurors]").
124. Note, Criminal Procedure-Jury Trial-Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure Requires Discharge of Alternate Juror When Jury Acts As Separate Entity,
19 Wayne L. Rev. 1605, 1614 n.57 (1973) [hereinafter When Alternate Jurors Act as Sepa-
rate Entity]; see Merei, Group Leadership and Institutionalization, in 2 Human Relations
23 (1949). In a study of groups of children, an assembly of children was considered a
"group" once it developed lasting rules and traditions. Id. at 23. Next, a child that had
previously exhibited leadership qualities (age, giving orders to other children, agressive-
ness, etc.) was placed with the established group. Id. at 24. Although the new "leader"
made his personality known to the other group members, in all of the experimental
groups, "the group absorb[ed] the leader, forcing its traditions on him." Id. at 25. More-
over, the leader remained unsuccessful in gaining acceptance of his original ideas. Id.; see
also J. Freedman, J. Carlsmith & D. Sears, Social Psychology 157-58 (1970) (discussing
Merei's study showing that newcomers have difficult time changing traditions of an estab-
lished group).
For an application of this study to jurors, see Note, When Alternate Jurors Act as
Separate Entity, supra, at 1614 n.57 (substituted alternate is less effective than regular
juror in determining outcome of deliberations).
125. See Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judg-
ments, 2 Readings in Social Psychology 2 (1952).
This study involved an experiment that placed an individual in a position that "radi-
cally conflicted" with that of the control group. Id. at 3. Each group, consisting of 8
male college students, "was instructed to judge a series of simple, clearly structured
perceptual relations." Id. The group members were instructed to announce their percep-
tions to the rest of the group. Seven of the 8 group members were part of the control
group and were secretly instructed to answer incorrectly on 12 of the 18 samples. On
these 12 occasions, the 8th group member ("subject") was faced with a situation where
each member of the control group announced an answer that was contrary to the objec-
tive facts but in agreement with the other members of the control group. Id. at 3-4.
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the theory that the alternate juror's inability to hold his own with the
original jurors frustrates jury impartiality.
Peek v. Kemp 126 illustrates the inherent coercive effect that may arise
from the post-submission substitution procedure. 2 In Peek, the defend-
ant received the death penalty after being tried and convicted of murder.
After one ful day of trial, the jury retired to deliberate at ten p.m. After
midnight, the foreman requested fifteen more minutes to deliberate, 2 ' an
indication that the jury was close to a verdict.' 29 A short time later, the
foreman returned and requested that the court excuse a juror who
seemed mentally unstable. 3 ° Subsequent fact findings showed that this
juror had been the lone holdout for acquittal.' Without questioning
him, the trial judge dismissed the juror and substituted an alternate in his
place. 3 2 The reconstituted jury convicted the defendant almost immedi-
ately.' 3 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, en banc, af-
firmed the district court's denial of habeas relief."a
In addition to the inherent coercive effect, whenever an alternate who
does not sit in is substituted after deliberations have begun, he has missed
part of the deliberative process. 35 The remaining original jurors are cog-
Next, it was the subject's turn to announce his answer. Many of the subjects conformed
their opinion to the incorrect group opinion. Id. at 10.
Applying this study to post-submission substitution, it follows that an alternate juror
who enters the deliberations after the regular jurors have formed a strong basis for opin-
ion could be pressured into adopting the opinions of the regular jurors as his own. See H.
Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 462-63 (1966) (applying Asch's study to jury
study).
126. Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (1Ith Cir. 1986) (en banc). Although Peek con-
cerned a juror substitution pursuant to Georgia state law, see id. at 1483, the decision is
relevant here for its consideration of the effect of such substitution on continuing jury
deliberations.
127. Two dissenting judges noted that the proper course to follow was to declare a
mistrial in cases of post-submission juror discharge. A mistrial would alleviate "the sig-
nificant risk that a verdict would [result] 'from pressures inherent in the situation rather
than the considered judgment of all the jurors.'" Id. at 1507 (Johnson, Clark, JJ., dis-
senting) (quoting Arizona v. Washington 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).
128. Peek, 784 F.2d at 1482.
129. See id. at 1506 (Johnson, Clark, J.J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 1482.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. There was a conflict in the record over how much time actually passed before the
reconstituted jury reached its verdict. The trial transcript indicated that it took only
three minutes for the second jury to convict the defendant. The testimony of the jury
foreman and both attorneys, however, indicated that the actual time of deliberations was
between fifteen and thirty minutes. Id. at 1482 n.2.
134. See id. at 1495. The court based its holding on a finding of no prejudice to the
defendant. See id. at 1484. The procedure used by this court, post-submission substitu-
tion, involves personal contact between the remaining regular jurors and an alternate.
Such contact, however, is always prejudicial to a criminal defendant. See supra note 133
and infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
135. See Hameed v. Jones, 750 F.2d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 1984) (an alternate who is substi-
tuted after submission would miss "the discussion and consideration that have previously
taken place"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2677 (1985).
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nizant of each other's outlooks and positions, 136 as well as those of the
discharged regular juror,'37 while the alternate does not have the benefit
of the previous discussions.
138
In cases of post-submission substitution, the discharged juror's state-
ments and opinions are no longer a proper basis for the jury's verdict. ' 39
Many courts rely on curative instructions to eliminate any prejudice to
the defendant," but fail to acknowledge that curative instructions sim-
ply may not be effective.' 4 ' In rejecting post-submission substitution, the
Advisory Committee noted that even if the reconstituted jury was re-
quired to review the prior deliberations, it seems likely that the continu-
ing jurors would be unable to nullify the effects of the prior
136. See People v. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d 100, 103, 224 N.E.2d 710, 712, 278 N.Y.S.2d 199,
202 (1966) (each remaining original juror would be cognizant of positions and outlooks of
others); State v. Lehman, 108 Wis.2d 291, 308, 321 N.W.2d 212, 220 (1982) ("The eleven
regular jurors will have formed views without the benefit of the views of the alternate
juror, and the alternate . . . will participate without the benefit of the prior group
discussion.").
137. See Lehman, 108 Wis.2d at 308, 321 N.W.2d at 220.
138. "[I]t is not desirable to allow a juror who is unfamiliar with the prior delibera-
tions to suddenly join the group and participate in the voting without the benefit of earlier
group discussion." 3 A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice § 15-2.7 commentary at
15.74 (2d ed. 1980). The Advisory Committee agreed with this rationale. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 300-01 (1983).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (2d Cir.) (finding essen-
tial feature of jury to be preserved through trial court's instructions to begin deliberations
anew and its explanation that " 'a jury verdict must be the product of the deliberations of
all twelve people who reach that verdict' "), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983)); United
States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 991 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981) (discussing trial court's
questioning of each juror to ascertain whether "he or she could ... wipe from his or her
mind the deliberations of the two previous days and start fresh and anew"), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1136 (1982); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97
F.R.D. 245, 301 (1983) (committee found central difficulty with post-submission substitu-
tion to be that "it still seems likely that the continuing jurors would be influenced by the
earlier deliberations").
140. See, e.g., United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir.) (judge instructed
jury to begin deliberations anew), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985); United States v.
Barker, 735 F.2d 1280, 1283 (lth Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984); United
States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 991 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1136 (1982).
141. Cf. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 513 (1978) (noting that curative instruc-
tions "will not necessarily remove the risk of bias that may be created by improper argu-
ment").
Similarly, when an alternate is substituted and the regular jurors' opinions have been
swayed by pre-substitution argument, people cannot easily forget argument once heard.
See Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (reversing defendant's convic-
tion because jury viewed newspaper containing prejudicial information, despite jurors'
assurances that they could deliberate fairly); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 155
(1891) (declaring mistrial when jury was exposed to newspaper article noting that "it
[would be] impossible for that jury ... to act with the independence and freedom on the
part of each juror requisite to a fair trial"); see also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575
(1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (" '[Tlhe naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
fiction.'" (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
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deliberations.142 As a result, the defendant may be convicted by the
twelve people in the jury room, plus the judgments and insights of the
discharged juror.
Post-submission substitution also is objectionable because it decreases
the probability of a hung jury. The probability of a hung jury increases
when a lone juror, who votes for acquittal, gets early support in the vot-
ing.143 If substitution were permissible, members of the regular jury may
try to influence a lone holdout juror to feign illness and thereby place the
burden of decision on an alternate.'" Thus, a substituted alternate, who
also votes for acquittal, may not be afforded an opportunity for early
support of his position, thereby lessening the defendant's chances of ob-
taining a mistrial.'45
142. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 298-301
(1983).
143. A statistical jury study supports the theory that "for one or two jurors to hold out
to the end, it would appear necessary that they had companionship at the beginning of
the deliberations." H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, supra note 124, at 462-63. This conclusion is
based on psychological research that shows that an individual group member will disbe-
lieve "his own correct observation" where he is the only member of the group to hold this
opinion. To remain firm in his convictions, "it is necessary for him to have at least one
ally." Id. at 463.
In addition, a psychological study has shown that, while a new group member will
conform his opinion to that of the existing group, despite objective evidence to the con-
trary, when the new member gets support from even one other group member, the likeli-
hood of his conforming to the group's opinion diminishes significantly. See Asch, supra
note 124, at 7-10.
The Supreme Court has characterized the study provided by Kalven and Zeisel as "the
most ambitious empirical study of jury behavior that has been attempted." Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575 (1967). See United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 834 n.15
(2d. Cir. 1985) (refusing defendant's request for post-submission substitution, court up-
held use of eleven-member juries as provided in Rule 23(b) citing jury study provided by
Kalven and Zeisel.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 2285 (1986).
144. See United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (a holdout juror
could be under pressure to "feign illness ... to place the burden of decision on an alter-
nate juror."); see also C. Wright, supra note 20, at 393 n.27 (citing United States v. Lamb,
529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1978)); cf. United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d
Cir.) (regular jurors might disable dissenter by pressuring him into agreeing with rest of
jury's thinking), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); State v. Lehman, 108 Wis.2d 291, 310,
321 N.W.2d 212, 221 (1982) (discussing state statute requiring discharge of alternates
after submission of case, court noted that juror "might be coerced into feigning incapacity
in order to be relieved of sitting on the jury" if substitution were permissible).
145. The following hypothetical illustrates this lost opportunity for early support. Af-
ter several days of deliberations the jury is deadlocked 11 to 1. One juror becomes seri-
ously ill and must be discharged. This discharged juror happens to be the lone holdout.
An alternate juror, who holds the same views as the discharged juror is then substituted.
Because this alternate had no allies in the early voting, however, he concludes that he
must be mistaken and gives up his position, agreeing with the majority. Were this to
happen, the defendant would be deprived of his "right to a mistrial if the original jury
could not reach agreement." United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975).
See H. Kalven, & H. Zeisel, supra note 124, at 463.
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C. Application of the Constitution and Federal Rules
to No-Contact Cases
In contrast to the contact cases, procedures that do not involve post-
submission contact do not affect any substantial rights of the defendant.
Keeping an alternate separately sequestered does not affect jury pri-
vacy. 146 Because the alternate never joins the regular jury's delibera-
tions, 47 the jury's impartiality also remains intact. 148 Further, even if the
sequestered alternate juror was considered part of the jury, this proce-
dure would not violate the Constitution as the Supreme Court has estab-
lished that a twelve-person jury is not constitutionally mandated . 49
Thus, failure to discharge the alternate jurors in violation of Rule 24(c),
by itself, would not be violative of the Constitution.
Rule 52(a) provides that Rule violations not affecting a defendant's
substantial rights shall be ignored. 50 A separately sequestered alternate
juror who has no post-submission contact with the jury could not possi-
bly affect the jury's decision making process. Thus, a defendant's sub-
stantial right to a jury trial is not affected by the procedure. The error is
harmless and should be ignored.
Conclusion
In the event of post-submission juror discharge, Rule 23(b) gives trial
courts the discretion to proceed with the remaining eleven jurors. Some
courts deviate from this procedural guideline and establish their own
procedures.
In the contact cases, the contact between an alternate and the regular
jurors risks affecting the decision-making processes of the jury. Such
contact violates the defendant's constitutional right to trial by an impar-
tial jury.
The Supreme Court has twice rejected a proposed rule that would have
provided for post-submission substitution. Lower courts should not im-
provise their own procedures that contravene the express decision of the
146. When an alternate juror is separately sequestered, he has no personal contact with
the regular jurors. Without personal contact, it is not possible for the alternate to affect
the decision-making processes of the jury. See United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 799
n.7 (9th Cir. 1984) (alternate separately sequestered with separate marshalls so that no
contact occurred between the alternate and regular jurors; court noted that "reversal
would be pointless where there is no reasonable possibility that the alternate jurors...
affected the verdict.").
147. Id.
148. In the no-contact cases, there can be no effect on the jury's ability to act with
independence and freedom. Moreover, the alternate jurors are never in a position to
influence the jury's deliberations. See United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944, 950 (2d
Cir.) (finding that separately sequestered alternates were not in position to influence
jury's deliberations), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968).
149. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972) (noting in dicta that proof of
case would be more compelling had jury consisted of more than 12 jurors); see also supra
notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
150. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).
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Supreme Court and Congress, particularly where the impact of this ad
hoc rulemaking has a potentially devastating effect on a defendant's sixth
amendment right to a fair and impartial jury. In addition, judicial im-
provisations on the rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme
Court conflict with the uniformity and simplicity goals behind the Fed-
eral Rules. Because post-submission substitution and sit-in procedures
affect the defendant's substantial right to trial by an impartial jury, use of
these procedures should constitute reversible error.
In cases that do not involve post-submission contact between an alter-
nate and the regular jurors, however, there is no possibility that the local
procedure affected the jury's verdict. Thus, the substantial rights of the
defendants are not affected and verdicts should not be disturbed.
Joshua G. Grunat

